

SMUG: Towards Robust MRI **Reconstruction by Smoothed Unrolling**

Hui Li¹, Jinghan Jia², Shijun Liang², Yuguang Yao², Saiprasad Ravishankar², Sijia Liu² ¹Huazhong University of Science of Technology, ²Michigan State University

MoDL in MRI Reconstruction

 $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} = rg\min \|\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}\|_{2}^{2} + \lambda \|\mathbf{x} - \mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})\|_{2}^{2}$

Execute two steps iteratively [1]:

- $\mathbf{\mathbf{\hat{v}}}(\mathbf{i})$ Denoising step $\mathbf{z}_n := \mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n)$
- $\mathbf{\hat{x}}$ (ii) Data-consistency step $\mathbf{x}_{n+1} = \arg \min_{\mathbf{x}} \|\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} \mathbf{y}\|_2^2 + \lambda \|\mathbf{x} \mathbf{z}_n\|_2^2$

Lack of Robustness in MoDL

- Change of number of unrolling steps









2× unrolling steps





Ground Truth

Fig. 6 & 7: PSNR of different methods versus perturbation strength used in PGD-generated adversarial examples (up), measurement sampling rate (4× acceleration i.e. 25% sampling rate) (middle), and number of unrolling step (down).



With adversarial input

Randomized Smoothing (RS)

♦ RS-E2E [2]: Integrating RS with MoDL in an end-to-end manner $g(\mathbf{A}^{H}\mathbf{y}) = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\nu} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \sigma^{2}\mathbf{I})}[\mathbf{x}_{\text{MODL}}(\mathbf{A}^{H}\mathbf{y} + \boldsymbol{\nu})]$



Q1: Where should the RS operator be integrated into MoDL? Q2: How to design the denoiser in the presence of RS?

SMUG Framework

SMUGv0: RS is incorporated into MoDL at each unrolling step



[1] Hemant K. Aggarwal, Merry P. Mani, and Mathews Jacob, "MoDL: Model-based deep learning architecture for inverse problems," IEEE Trans. Med. Imaging, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 394–405, Feb. 2019 [2] Adva Wolf, "Making medical image reconstruction adversarially robust," 2019.

CASSP





SMUG: RS only applies to the denoising network $\mathrm{RS}(\mathcal{D}) = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\nu} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \sigma^2 \mathbf{I})} [\mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_{n-1} + \boldsymbol{\nu})] := \mathbf{z}_n$ Add Gaussian noises Input: $A^H y$ Denoiser D Data-consistency (DC) Block

SMUG Training

 $\mathbf{P}_{\text{re-training}} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{\text{pre}} = \arg\min \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{t} \in \mathcal{D}} [\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} || \mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{t} + \boldsymbol{\nu}) - \mathbf{t} ||_2^2]$

* The denoiser is pre-trained alone to provide a robustness-aware initialization for fine-tuning ✤ Fine-tuning

Unrolled Stability (UStab) loss $\ell_{\text{UStab}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{t}) = \sum_{n=1}^{N-1} \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\nu}} ||\mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}_n + \boldsymbol{\nu}) - \mathcal{D}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{t})||_2^2$

Fine-tuning loss
$$\ell(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{t}) = \lambda_{\ell} \| \mathbf{x}_{N}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathbf{A}^{H} \mathbf{y}) - \mathbf{t} \|_{2}^{2} + \ell_{\text{UStab}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{t})$$

Experiment Results

Table 1: Accuracy performance of different methods. 'Clean Accuracy', 'Noise Accuracy', and 'Robust Accuracy' refer to evaluation on benign data, random noise-injected data, and PGD attack-enabled adversarial data, respectively. The relative performance is reported w.r.t vanilla MoDL.

Models	Clean Accuracy		Noise Accuracy		Robust Accuracy	
Metrics	PSNR ↑	SSIM ↑	PSNR ↑	SSIM ↑	PSNR ↑	SSIM ↑
illa MoDL	29.73±3.27	$0.900{\pm}0.07$	28.70±2.77	$0.874 {\pm} 0.07$	22.91±2.42	$0.729{\pm}0.07$
RS-E2E	+0.09±3.24	+ 0.002 ±0.07	$+0.38\pm2.90$	$+0.010\pm0.07$	$+0.78\pm2.70$	+0.034±0.08
MUGv0	-1.01 ± 3.07	$-0.014{\pm}0.08$	-0.09 ± 2.99	$+0.008 \pm 0.08$	$+3.08\pm2.42$	-0.014 ± 0.11
UG (ours)	-0.34 ± 3.06	-0.006 ± 0.08	+0.53±2.98	+ 0.016 ±0.08	+3.87±2.28	$+0.008\pm0.11$



Vanilla MoDL







Fig. 5: Visualization of ground-truth and reconstructed images using different methods, evaluated on PGD attack-generated adversarial inputs.



Contact: huili_70@outlook.com, jiajingh@msu.edu